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Abstract
Governments in the EU grant Rescue and Restructure Subsidies to bail out ailing
firms. In an international asymmetric Cournot duopoly we study effects of such sub-
sidies on market structure and welfare. We adopt a common market setting, where
consumers from the two countries form one market. We show that the subsidy is
positive also when it fails to prevent the exit. The reason is a strategic effect, which
forces the more efficient firm to make additional cost-reducing effort. When the exit is
prevented, allocative and productive efficiencies are lower and the only gaining player
is the rescued firm.
Keywords: subsidies, asymmetric oligopoly, exit, European Union
JEL Classification: F13, L13, L52.
∗I am very grateful to Jos Jansen for his comments on an earlier version of this paper. I also thank
Paul Heidhues, J. Peter Neary, Lars-Hendrik Ro¨ller, Oz Shy and participant of ETSG 2005 conference for
helpful discussions. All remaining mistakes are mine.
1 Introduction
Bailouts by governments in the EU are strictly regulated. Each time they must be ap-
proved by the EC Commission and the approval is conditional on a set of criteria gathered
in the ”Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in
Difficulty”1. The guidelines focus on limiting distortions of competition to the minimum
and give strict conditions for approvals of bailouts, e.g. one time -last time principle or
a requirement of a proof of limited distortions in trade between member states caused by
such a subsidy. Compensation measures are often imposed, such as selling a part of the
market share to competitors of the beneficiary. The reason for these strict conditions is
that R&R subsidies are particularly prone to distort competition among member states,
as they may be acting against competitive forces which caused the exit. Such subsidies
disadvantage competitors, who have to restructure with their own resources.
Strategic trade theory confirms this concern: literature started by Brander and Spencer
(1983) shows that if countries grant subsidies strategically, they can improve the position
of the subsidized national champion at the expense of the foreign firm. To the best of my
knowledge, however, none of these models allows for a subsidy to bail out an exiting firm,
since only interior solutions in the output game are analyzed. To analyze R&R subsidies
we need to account for endogenous exit, which is our contribution to the literature.
In addition, strategic trade theory typically assumes that home and foreign firms com-
pete in a third country, so the governments do not consider consumer surplus in their
decisions about aid (an exception is Collie (2000) and (2002)). Still, consumer surplus
is an important aspect in the debate on R&R, since monitoring of state aid in the EU
is said to take place in order to protect consumers’ interests.2 Therefore, we incorporate
the common market structure into the analysis: the subsidizing government maximizes
not only profits of firms in her country, but also country’s share in consumer surplus.
Countries in the EU are very different in size, therefore asymmetry in this share is also
accounted for.
Lahiri and Ono (1988) and Neary (1994) recommend social planners to tax high-cost
1Official Journal of the European Union, 2004/C 244/02
2EU competition policy and the consumer, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities, 2004.
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and subsidize low-cost firms. Such policy creates a higher concentration in the market, but
it improves welfare, since the firms with the increased market share are also more efficient.
From this perspective, R&R subsidy shifts resources in the ”wrong” direction, because it
is meant to increase market share of the inefficient firm. The problem is that individual
governments maximize only a part of total EU welfare, so a bailout can be harmful for
the EU, but still profitable for one country. We asses these externalities of R&R subsidies
on welfare in the EU in total and for member states of different sizes separately.
We consider a duopoly with two firms, each located in a different country, but selling
in a common market. The firms have ex ante asymmetric unit production costs. They
restructure in order to decrease these costs and then compete by setting quantities. Exit
results from production inefficiency in one of the firms. In such a case the government
can rescue the firm by subsidizing some additional restructuring and the bill is paid by
consumers from the country of the aid beneficiary. When making this decision, the govern-
ment maximizes welfare defined as profit of the firm and consumer surplus in the country.
We are interested in two issues: the benefit from keeping the inefficient firm in the market
and externalities of R&R subsidies on all players in the model. We also try to find a
rationale for strict control of R&R subsidies in the EU.
We have two main results. First, an R&R subsidy fulfils two different roles. If cost
differences are low and the subsidizing country small enough, the subsidy rescues the
inefficient firm (we call this a successful rescue), increases welfare of the intervening country
by increasing the profits of the aid beneficiary and decreasing the surplus of all consumers.
If the cost asymmetry is higher, the subsidy is given, but it does not prevent the firm from
exit (which we call a failed rescue). The subsidy is however only an apparent waste,
since it provides a threat of no-exit to the efficient firm and forces this firm to cut its
costs more than an unconstrained monopoly would. This strategic effect improves both
productive and allocative efficiencies. The government is willing to grant such subsidy,
because consumer surplus increases as the result of this intervention.
Second, externalities of the subsidy differ depending on whether the rescue succeeds
or not. In a successful rescue, consumers and the competitor of the beneficiary are worse
off, while the subsidized firm gains. In a failed rescue, consumers are better off and firm
2 loses. Externalities on welfare depend on the country’s share in consumer surplus (we
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call it country’s size). The size determines the amount of aid paid out and the way gains
from the subsidy are distributed between member states. If the country is small, the
government cares relatively more about the profits than about the price and therefore
the subsidy is successful for a large set of initial cost asymmetries. Welfare of the other
country and total welfare are reduced. When the subsidizing country is big enough, only
failed rescues take place. Externality on welfare of the other country is negative, but total
welfare increases thanks to higher consumer surplus.
If consumer surplus or total welfare were her objective, the Commission should ban
R&R subsidies which are likely to prevent exit, since they result in a price rise and a
loss in productive efficiency. Crucial assumptions for this result were asymmetries across
countries and across firms. This is an explanation alternative to the argument by Collie
(2000) and (2002) that distortionary taxation in a symmetric model may be the reason
for aid prohibition. In this way we want to contribute to the discussion on state aid policy
in the EU, which is at the top of the agenda of the current Competition Commissioner
Neelie Kroes3.
2 Model Setup
There are two countries. Each country has one government and one firm. Firms produce
a homogenous good, which is sold on a common market without barriers in trade. Gov-
ernments maximize welfare defined as profit of the firm in their country and the country’s
share in consumer surplus. Let country 1’s share in consumer surplus be α and country
2’s share 1− α. Denoting welfare in country i as Wi we have:
W1 = pi1 + αCS (1)
W2 = pi2 + (1− α)CS (2)
W =W1 +W2 = pi1 + pi2 + CS. (3)
Firms maximize profits. Production cost functions are linear with asymmetric marginal
costs denoted by c1 and c2 and we assume c1 > c2. This asymmetry is exogenous. Inverse
3Introductory Statement at EMAC Open Meeting of Coordinators, Feb. 3rd, 2005.
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demand is P = P (x), where x = x1 + x2 with P ′(x) < 0. The game has three stages.
First, the government with the less efficient firm commits to subsidize restructuring if
the firm has to exit without help. Then firms restructure on their own and finally firms
compete by setting quantities. Restructuring is modelled as process-R&D: it means cutting
marginal cost by ei at the cost of d2e
2
i , where d > 0. It is important to note that the cost
of restructuring is the same for both firms and for the government.4 We solve for the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium by backward induction.
If there is no exit, there is no subsidy and firms’ profits are
pii = P (x)xi − (ci − ei)xi − d2e
2
i i = 1, 2. (4)
As typically happens in asymmetric Cournot games, if the initial marginal cost dif-
ference is high enough, the less efficient firm exits and a monopoly of the more efficient
one emerges in the equilibrium. Government 1 can perfectly anticipate when firm 1 will
exit in the equilibrium. In such a case, the government can subsidize further restructuring
in firm 1 by d2k
2
1 and reduce marginal costs additionally by k1. Two payoffs are changed
(with subscript s):
pi1s = P (x)x1 − (c1 − e1 − k1)x1 − d2e
2
1 (5)
W1s = pi1s − d2k
2
1 + αCS. (6)
This definition of subsidy is similar to definitions used in the literature in the sense
that it affects marginal costs directly.5 On the other hand, R&R subsidy differs from
commonly used subsidy definitions, because with the subsidy the government gives her
own restructuring technology to the firm. She behaves as an entrepreneur and actually
makes some decisions, what gives country 1 a cost advantage since d2e
2
1+
d
2k
2
1 <
d
2(e1+k1)
2.
In reality, transfer of technology often happens in R&R cases, since governments and public
agencies actively participate in designing a restructuring plan or negotiating with unions.
4One could argue that restructuring is more expensive for the low-cost firm since it has no ”slack”
or X-inefficiency, so that for example parameter d for this firm should be higher. It is a valid concern,
since Aghion and Schankerman (2004) allow for such slack and find that the equilibrium can have totally
different properties than in the symmetric case.
5Mollgaard (2004) is an exception, defining aid as a reduction in the cost of capital.
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Sometimes a government hires a consulting firm to do the job of preventing exit. Generally
we can say that when bankruptcy is in sight, governments take unusual measures to save
the firm and these unusual measures are the new restructuring technology.
Government 2 cannot subsidize, which is another asymmetry in the model and we
introduce it in order to reflect the rules in the EU: only otherwise exiting firms can be
subsidized and firm 2 in the equilibrium of our benchmark no-subsidy model never exits.
Finally, a comment on technical issues. Our problem is by nature asymmetric. Since
asymmetric general models are difficult to solve, we make a compromise by choosing
specific functional forms of both cost functions (linear and quadratic), leaving demand
general and using linear demand case as an example. Welfare effects are presented only
for the example of linear demand. This model structure is motivated by the fact that
properties of the demand function seem to be crucial for optimal R&D subsidies. For
example, Lahiri and Ono (2004) show that, when firms are symmetric, the sign of the
subsidy is the same as the sign of the second derivative of demand. We limit our attention
to pure strategy equilibria.
3 Benchmark Equilibrium: no subsidy
As a benchmark for the rescue subsidy game we consider a two-stage game, where both
governments are passive and their payoffs result only from actions of firms. Firms simul-
taneously choose restructuring level and then decide about output level. Since we do not
exclude exit, which is an unusual aspect of this model, we will look at this game in some
detail.
In the second stage of the game, first order conditions for duopoly equilibrium are
P ′(x)xi + P (x)− ci + ei = 0 i = 1, 2. (7)
which implicitly define xi(e1, e2). We assume that second order conditions P ′′(x)xi +
2P ′(x) < 0, and stability conditions P ′′(x)xi + P ′(x) < 0 and ∂
2pii
∂x2i
> ∂
2pii
∂xi∂xj
hold. Totally
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differentiating (7) and using the assumptions, we obtain comparative statics results:
dxi
dei
> 0
dxj
dei
< 0
dx
dei
> 0, (8)
which indicate that restructuring expands own and total output, while reducing competi-
tor’s output. That implies that competitor’s market share is decreased. In the first stage,
first order conditions6 are
P ′(x)xi
∂x
∂ei
+ (P (x)− ci + ei)∂xi
∂ei
+ xi − dei = 0 i = 1, 2 (9)
and using (7) we can simplify them to
xi + xiP ′(x)
∂xj
∂ei
= dei i = 1, 2. (10)
The marginal cost of restructuring (right-hand side) equals the marginal revenue (left-
hand side), which is composed of two effects. The direct effect is just a decrease of the
production cost, represented here by xi. The second expression represents the strategic ef-
fect restructuring has on the competitor’s output. Since both derivatives in this expression
are negative, their product is positive, so the strategic effect increases marginal revenue
of restructuring.
Equations (7) and (10) implicitly define the equilibrium xDi (c1, c2) and e
D
i (c1, c2) (D
stands for duopoly).
Comparing duopoly restructuring levels eD1 and e
D
2 , Lahiri and Ono (2004) prove
7 the
following
Proposition 1 The firm with lower initial marginal cost invests more in restructuring.
Low-cost firm reduces marginal cost by more than the rival, so that the initial cost differ-
ence is magnified. This observation goes back to the hypothesis of Schumpeter that big
firms are better innovators (in terms of production process) than high-cost firms, since
they are able to exploit cost-cuts on a larger scale.
For c1− c2 sufficiently high, a monopoly of firm 2 is the equilibrium. There can be two
6We assume second order conditions to hold.
7The proof can be found on page 24 of the book.
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qualitatively different outcomes: blockaded monopoly, which operates unconstrained by
the potential entry (here rather non-exit) of firm 1, and entry-deterring monopoly, where
the competitor is strategically excluded from the market. First we consider a blockaded
monopoly. First order condition in the output stage is
P ′(x2)x2 + P (x2)− c2 + e2 = 0, (11)
which implicitly defines x2(e2). We assume second order condition P ′′ + 2P ′ < 0 to hold.
Differentiating (11) with respect to e2 and using the second order condition we find that
dx2
de2
> 0. (12)
In the first stage, the first order condition8 is
P ′(x2)x2
∂x2
∂e2
+ (P (x2)− c2 + e2)∂x2
∂e2
+ x2 − de2 = 0 (13)
and using (11) it boils down to a simple equation
x2 = de2. (14)
In case of monopoly there is no strategic effect of e2 on x1, so the effect of restructuring
is just the reduction of production cost. Equations (11) and (14) together define xM2 (c2)
and eM2 (c2) (M stands for monopoly).
When entry-deterrence takes place, firm 2 increases its output above monopoly level
to exclude the competitor. In such a situation, x2 is at the level which nullifies x1(e1, e2)
calculated from (7), that is x2 such that
[P ′(x1 + x2)x1 + P (x1 + x2)− c1 + e1]x1=0 = 0, (15)
from which we get
P (x2) = c1 − e1. (16)
8We assume second order conditions to hold.
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Optimal output of firm 1 is then 0, and therefore also restructuring level is zero: xE1 = 0
and eE1 = 0 (E stands for entry-deterrence). Going back to equation (16) we get
P (xE2 ) = c1. (17)
Firm 2 produces as much as is necessary to price the good at the marginal cost of the
competitor and in this way enforces its exit. The optimal restructuring level leading to
this output follows from equation (14):
xE2 = de
E
2 . (18)
3.1 Linear Demand Example
If inverse demand is linear, e.g. p = 1−x1−x2, the equilibrium can be explicitly calculated.
To simplify complex calculations, we fix the parameters d and c2. We choose d = 5 so that
all profit functions are concave and c2 = 0.4 so that we avoid a number of corner solutions
and focus exclusively on the role of the asymmetry in initial cost for the market structure
in the equilibrium9. Let us define c1 = 0.485749, c˜1 = 0.532987 and c1 = 0.6667.
Proposition 2 For c1 ∈ (0.4, c1) duopoly emerges in the equilibrium with optimal strate-
gies:
eD1 = 4
17− 26c1
451
xD1 =
15
4
eD1 (19)
eD2 = 4
0.6 + 15c1
451
xD2 =
15
4
eD2 . (20)
Entry-deterring monopoly of firm 2 emerges when c1 ∈ (c˜1, c1). Optimal strategies are
eE2 =
1− c1
5
xE2 = 5e
E
2 . (21)
For c1 ∈ (c1, 1) equilibrium market structure is blockaded monopoly of firm 2 with optimal
9Qualitatively, we get the same results choosing any d ∈ (4,∞) and c2 ∈ (0.2, 0.5). For c2 < 0.2 there
are more and for c2 > 0.5 less corner solutions to consider, but the mechanism is the same.
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strategies
eM2 =
1
15
xM2 = 5e
M
2 . (22)
The proof can be found in the Appendix, but in order to build some intuition we
present reaction functions of the three equilibrium market structures in the first stage of
the game:
e2
E
e1
r2
r1
(a) monopoly
E
e2
e1
r2
r1
(b) entry-deterrence
E
e2
e1
r2
r1
(c) duopoly
Figure 1: In the equilibrium of the benchmark game there are three possible market
structures.
Figure 1(a) shows the case when firm 2 has a very high efficiency advantage. Its
reaction function is composed of 5 pieces. For e1 very low, best-reply of firm 2 is a
blockaded monopoly with restructuring constant in e1. When e1 is higher, firm 2 deters
entry of firm 1 by increasing its restructuring level. This is the second, increasing part of
the reaction function. For higher e1, best reply is accommodation, so that the outcome
is duopoly. In that case the reaction function is decreasing. The fourth piece is where
duopoly as a corner solution is the best-reply. Finally, if e1 is too high, best reply is not
to restructure and exit, so the reaction function coincides with e1 axis. Firm 1’s reaction
function has only 3 pieces, since firm 1 has a higher initial production cost and neither
monopoly nor entry-deterrence are achievable, but the logic is the same. Both reaction
functions cut in point E, where firm 1 chooses to exit and firm 2 restructures at the
monopoly level.
Figure 1(b) shows the case when firm 2 has a moderate efficiency advantage. Its
reaction function is pushed to the left, so that monopoly part is not possible for positive
9
e1. The equilibrium is entry-deterrence by firm 2, since firm 2’s best-reply to e2 = 0 is
entry-deterring restructuring level, which is higher than in monopoly. Finally, figure 1(c)
shows duopoly equilibrium, where downward-sloping parts of the reaction functions cut
and both firms end up with positive restructuring and production.
Looking at the functional forms of the duopoly restructuring levels (19) and (20), we
notice that the result exemplifies Proposition 1: for c1 > 0.4 we have eD1 < e
D
2 , and the final
cost difference is higher than initially. This result is robust to the definition of competition:
Aghion and Schankerman (2004) got it for Salop model, Lahiri and Ono (2004) for Cournot
duopoly with general demand, Escrihuela-Villar (2004) for n-firm Cournot competition
with linear demand, Ro¨ller and Sinclair-Desgagne (1996) for two-market Cournot duopoly.
In entry-deterrence outcome (16), however, eE2 decreases with c1, since the bigger the initial
cost difference, the bigger efficiency advantage of firm 2, so that less aggressive predatory
behavior is sufficient to deter entry of firm 1. This finding will be crucial in further analysis.
4 Subsidy Equilibrium
If the initial cost asymmetry is too big, firm 1 exits (in the example it happens for c1 > c˜1).
In the EU, government 1 could then subsidize some additional restructuring in firm 1. We
will introduce this possibility to the game by extending the benchmark model by a stage,
where government 1 can choose to do it.
The new game has three stages. In the first stage, government 1 commits to subsidize
firm 1’s restructuring process with s = d2k
2
1 in order to lower its marginal cost by k1 if
without help the firm exits. Government 2 is not allowed to subsidize. In the second
stage firms choose their restructuring level and the subsidy is paid. In the third stage they
compete a´ la Cournot. Such formulation of the game reflects the rules of the EU common
market, where governments can subsidize restructuring of ailing firms and they usually
get involved into restructuring process. The outcomes are denoted by a subscript s.
In the third stage, when duopoly emerges, first order conditions are
P ′(x)x1 + P (x)− c1 + e1 + k1 = 0 (23)
P ′(x)x2 + P (x)− c2 + e2 = 0. (24)
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We assume that second order conditions P ′′(x)xi + 2P ′(x) < 0 and stability conditions
hold. Comparative statics is done analogously to the benchmark game and we conclude
that
dx1
dk1
> 0
dx2
dk1
< 0
dx
dk1
> 0. (25)
The subsidy works exactly like restructuring by firm 1. It increases the output of the
beneficiary at the cost of its more efficient competitor and the total output is also increased.
This is the traditional profit-shifting effect of subsidies in strategic trade subsidy games.
In the second stage of duopoly, first order conditions are just like in the benchmark
case:
xi + xiP ′(x)
∂xj
∂ei
= dei i = 1, 2. (26)
Both first order conditions together implicitly define equilibrium outputs and restructuring
as functions of k1. Just as before, restructuring has a direct and a strategic impact on the
marginal revenue.
In entry-deterrence, if the subsidy is positive, the increase of output in firm 2 must be
such that
P (xEs2 ) = c1 − k1. (27)
This equation shows the strategic effect of the subsidy. The government changes the initial
conditions of the game between the firms: firm 2 has to adapt its strategy to the lower
initial cost of firm 1. Since demand is decreasing, we have xE2 < x
Es
2 . Firm 2 produces
more output to deter firm 1, because firm 1 is more efficient thanks to the subsidy.
In unconstrained monopoly, output and restructuring in firm 2 are the same as in the
benchmark.
In the first stage, government 1 optimally chooses k1. In case of duopoly welfare in
country 1 is
W1s(k1) = P (x)x1 − (c1 − e1 − k1)x1 − d2e
2
1 −
d
2
k21 + α
∫ xD
0
(P (x)− P (xD))dx (28)
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and we further assume that it is concave. Optimal k1 is the one which nullifies derivative
of W1s with respect to k1:
x1 + x1
∂e1
∂k1
+ x1P ′(x)
∂x2
∂k1
− αxP ′(x) ∂x
∂k1
= d(
∂e1
∂k1
e1 + k1). (29)
The above equation shows all effects of the subsidy on welfare in country 1. The first term
is the direct effect on the output in firm 1: marginal cost of production decreases so each
unit of output brings higher revenue. The second term is the strategic effect on firm 1,
due to which firm 1 restructures more by its own. This is a consequence of Proposition 1.,
since when the subsidy is positive, firm 1 has lower initial marginal cost. The third term
is the strategic effect on the other firm (selection or profit-shifting effect). In reaction to
a positive subsidy, firm 2’s output decreases and firm 1 grabs a bigger market share. The
fourth term on the left-hand side of the equation reflects the price drop as the effect of
the subsidy (competitive effect). The higher k1, the lower the price, because total output
increases. Summing up, as the result of the subsidy allocative efficiency is improved, but
productive efficiency may be reduced due to the selection effect. The term on the right-
hand side is the marginal cost of restructuring and it consists of the subsidy cost which
consumers have to pay, as well as the cost of restructuring paid by the firm which is higher
than in the benchmark due to the positive subsidy.
If entry-deterrence is the equilibrium, government 1 chooses k1 such that
W1s = −d2k
2
1 + α
∫ xE2
0
(P (x)− P (xE2 ))dx (30)
is maximized. Again we assume that this function is concave with respect to k1. The first
order condition is
∂W1s
∂k1
= −αx2P ′(x2)∂x2
∂k1
− dk1 = 0. (31)
We assumed that P ′(x) is negative, we also know from (27) that ∂x2∂k1 is positive. Therefore,
the derivative ∂W1s∂k1 evaluated in k1 = 0 is positive. Since W1s is concave, k1 satisfying
(31) must be positive. We can conclude that in entry-deterrence the subsidy is positive.
The government tries to bail the firm out, but the firm exits.
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Proposition 3 (Failed Rescue) If the equilibrium is entry-deterring monopoly of the
more efficient firm, the R&R subsidy to the exiting firm is positive.
Even when the less efficient firm exits for sure and the subsidy is nothing more than burning
consumers’ money, government 1 has a good reason to do it: the market is imperfectly
competitive and the subsidy has a strategic effect on the efficient firm. This firm decreases
the price so much, that even having paid for the subsidy, consumers in country 1 are better
off. Consumers in country 2 gain even more, since they don’t pay for the costly policy of
government 1.
4.1 Linear Demand Example
For the sake of brevity, we define the following terms:
f1(α) = 0.33359 + 0.0366975α− 0.024098
√
(α− 28.168411)(α+ 0.50916) (32)
f2(α) = 0.5829− 0.109912α (33)
f3(α) = 0.485749 + 0.10285α+ 0.062697
√
(α− 5)(α− 0.35357) for α ∈ (0, 0.3535)
(34)
f4(α) = 1− 0.14907
√
5− α (35)
f5(α) = 0.56271 + 0.02856α− 1.38407
√
(α− 28.1684)2(α− 0.27334)
153377− 5445α for α ∈ (0.27334, 1)
(36)
f6(α) = 0.47224 + 0.0467α (37)
m4 = 0.52709 + 0.02982α m5 = 0.532987 + 0.0934α (38)
and in the Appendix we prove
Proposition 4 Six different equilibrium outcomes emerge, depending on the parameters
vector (α, c1).
1. If condition 0.4 < c1 < min[f1(α), f6(α)] is fulfilled, entry-deterrence by firm 1
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emerges in the equilibrium with strategies
kE11 = c1 − 0.229143 eE11 = 0.12 xE11 = 5eE11 . (39)
2. When f1(α) < c1 < min[m4(α), f5(α)], duopoly emerges with strategies
eD1 = 4
17− 26(c1 − kD1 )
451
xD1 =
15
4
eD1 (40)
eD2 = 4
0.6 + 15(c1 − kD1 )
451
xD2 =
15
4
eD2 (41)
kD1 =
−0.804028 + 1.22969c1 − 0.214158α+ 0.133849c1α
0.133849α− 3.77031 . (42)
3. If m4(α) < c1 < min[f2(α), f3(α)], duopoly emerges as well, but the corner subsidy
kDc1 = c1 − 0.485749 (43)
is chosen instead of kD1 .
4. For max[f2(α), f5(α), f6(α)] < c1 < m5(α), entry-deterrence by firm 2 emerges:
kE2c1 = c1 − 0.532987 eE22 =
1
5
(1− c1 + kE2c1 ) xE22 = 5eE22 . (44)
5. If max[f3(α),m5(α)] < c1 < f4(α), entry-deterrence by firm 2 emerges with strategies
kE21 =
α(1− c1)
5− α e
E2
2 =
1
5
(1− c1 + kE21 ) xE22 = 5eE22 . (45)
6. Finally, for c1 > f4(α), firm 2 is a blockaded monopolist and the optimal subsidy is
zero.
How does the subsidy actually work? Figure 2 helps to develop some intuition. Reaction
functions of the benchmark game are depicted in black and those of the subsidy game in
red.
Figure 2(a) shows a failed rescue. The benchmark equilibrium is entry-deterring
monopoly of firm 2, denoted by E. Due to the subsidy, equilibrium is moved to point
Es, which is also the entry-deterring monopoly of firm 2, but with a higher restructuring
14
e2
e1
r2
r1
E
Es
(a) failed rescue
Es
E
r2
r1
e2
e1
(b) successful rescue
Figure 2: The subsidy game has two very different outcomes.
level. Figure 2(b) illustrates a successful rescue: entry-deterrence equilibrium E changes
into duopoly equilibrium Es, firm 1 is successfully rescued.
When c1 > c˜1, firm 1 exits in the equilibrium of the benchmark model and only then
the subsidy is legal. Therefore, we analyze the subsidy equilibrium for c1 > c˜110. Figure
3 shows the location of each market structure in the (α, c1) space.
alpha
D
0,46244
M2
E2
c1
1
Figure 3: The subsidy game results in one of three market structures: duopoly (D), entry-
deterrence by firm 2 (E2) or blockaded monopoly of firm 2 (M2).
Comparing this outcome with the equilibrium in the benchmark case allows us to make
a few interesting observations. The first observation is a confirmation of Proposition 3:
kE2c1 and k
E2
1 are positive. In entry-deterrence of firm 2, government 1 still subsidizes firm
10We skip the set c1 ∈ (c1, c˜1) since they have no equilibrium in the benchmark.
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1 in order to achieve the desired strategic effect on firm 2. This effect consists of making
firm 1 a little more efficient, so that firm 2 has to be more aggressive in cost-cutting to
deter entry of firm 1. The result is a lower production cost and a lower price, which is
beneficial for consumers in both countries.
The second observation is that duopoly is now more common: more parameter vectors
result in duopoly. These vectors, which in the benchmark ended up with monopoly and
with the subsidy lead to duopoly, guarantee a successful rescue. In these cases the original
purpose of the subsidy is achieved: the less efficient firm is rescued from exit. Note that the
lower α, the larger the set of c1 which leads to successful rescue, while for α > 0.462443
duopoly is not possible at all. That is because a big country has bigger incentives to
subsidize an unsuccessful rescue: there are more consumers who gain from the decline
of the price and are ready to pay for the subsidy. That implies that the strategic effect
on the competing firm is stronger. From this we can draw a testable conclusion that
small countries should experience more successful rescues, while big countries more failed
rescues.
In the subsidy equilibrium there is less monopoly than in the benchmark. Entry-
deterring monopoly of firm 2 is more beneficial to welfare in country 1 than blockaded
monopoly of firm 2, so government 1 grants a subsidy in order to force firm 2 to deter
entry.
The final remark is on the fact, that the government’s intervention allows the market
to achieve equilibrium also for parameter vectors, for which there is no pure-strategy
equilibrium in the benchmark.
5 Welfare analysis
In this section we study externalities of R&R subsidy on the welfare distribution under
the assumption of linear demand. The subsidy is positive in case of successful rescue,
which happens for initial parameter vectors (α, c1) such that c˜1 < c1 < h(c1), and for
failed rescue which happens for initial parameter vectors (α, c1) such that h(c1) < c1 < f4,
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where
h(c1) =

f3 for α ∈ (0, 0.24562),
f2 for α ∈ (0.24562, 0.399563),
f5 for α ∈ (0.399563, 0.462443),
c˜1 for α ∈ (0.462443, 1).
(46)
The first comparison we make across prices.
Corollary 5 Compared with the benchmark equilibrium price, the subsidy equilibrium
price increases in successful rescue, but decreases in failed rescue.
In case of successful rescue, duopoly is the outcome. The high-cost firm also produces,
which drives the average production cost up. As the result, the price is higher compared
with the benchmark and all consumers are harmed. Consumers in country 1 lose even
more than those in country 2, because they additionally have to pay for the subsidy. The
gain on firm 1’s profit, however, is high enough, so that country 1’s welfare is increased. In
failed rescue, entry-deterrence of firm 2 is the outcome. The price is then P (xEs2 ) = c1−k1
and since the subsidy is positive, it is lower then c1, which is the price in entry-deterrence
in the benchmark. Naturally such P (xEs2 ) is also lower than monopoly price, which is the
highest of all prices in our model.
Comparing profits leads us to the following
Corollary 6 Industry profits decrease in both successful and in failed rescue.
If the rescue fails, firm 2 has to restructure more aggressively in order to keep firm 1 out
of the market. Therefore, its profits are lower than in the benchmark case. In successful
rescue, total profit and profit of firm 2 decrease, since firm 2 restructures less than in the
benchmark and additionally inefficient firm 1 also produces, so production costs are higher
and even the higher price is not able to compensate it.
An example of welfare changes is depicted in Figures 4 and 5. We plot all parts of
welfare as a function of c1, holding α fixed at two different levels. Dashed lines represent
the benchmark model, while continuous lines illustrate the subsidy game.
We can observe the following regularities. Country 1 is always better off. In successful
rescue it gains on profit, in a failed rescue it gains on consumer surplus. This is a conse-
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Figure 4: Effects of the subsidy for α = 0.2.
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Figure 5: Effects of the subsidy for α = 0.85.
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quence of the game construction: government 1 acts as the first one and by setting k1 = 0
she can always get at least the benchmark welfare. Therefore in the subsidy game she can
do better.
Welfare in country 2 increases when consumer surplus increases a lot and country 2’s
share in consumer surplus in very high. That is the case for failed rescue and low α. In
a successful rescue consumers are harmed and firm 2 loses market share, so welfare 2 in
that case decreases compared with the benchmark. Also when α is high enough, welfare
2 declines since entry-deterring profits are lower and a big part of consumer gain belongs
to country 1.
The change in total welfare is a sum of the above two. In case of a successful rescue
total welfare drops and this drop is caused mainly by smaller consumer surplus and higher
total production cost. In a failed rescue total welfare increases, since the subsidy enforces
a lower price and the cost of the subsidy is low enough to make such rescue profitable for
consumers.
6 Conclusions
Summing up, we showed that depending on the initial cost asymmetry between firms and
the asymmetry in countries’ share in consumer surplus, rescue and restructure subsidy
has one of the following effects: it can save the high-cost firm from the exit and in this
way reduce productive and allocative efficiencies in the common market, or it can have
a strategic impact on the entry-deterring monopolist and in this way increase allocative
efficiency, without preventing exit of the beneficiary.
We find that the role of asymmetry in size is very important: countries with equally
inefficient firms, but different shares in consumer surplus, choose very different policies.
Roughly speaking, big countries do not prevent exit, while small countries do.
In the airlines industry, governments of several small countries tried to prevent exit
of their national champions, e.g. the Greek government granted rescue aid to Olympic
Airways and very recently the Commission approved a bailout of Cyprus Airways. These
rescues were successful in the bailout, but were likely to keep prices high. The situation
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could be different in case of the Italian government’s subsidy for Alitalia. It is still not
sure if the exit was prevented, but if Alitalia exits, welfare in both Italy and the whole
EC may increase due to lower prices, which come about because other airlines restructure
more in the presence of a subsidy, than they would in its absence.
Different behavior of asymmetric firms and countries can be a rationale for the EC
control of subsidies. In our model, subsidies which actually succeed in the rescue decrease
welfare of all consumers and total welfare. This can be a reason to ban them. On the
other hand, subsidies which fail to rescue are welfare improving. Their aim is purely to
distort free market, but to the advantage of consumers.
The model of course has its limitations. One of them is lack of dynamics, so that smaller
dynamic incentives to invest caused by the subsidy cannot be observed. This effect (called
soft budget constraints in the literature) will most likely show up in a dynamic setting
and lead to further welfare reduction in case of successful rescues. Another limitation is
that governments most likely have other objectives than welfare when rescuing a firm, e.g.
jobs, reelection or bribes. These are just two promising ideas for the future work on rescue
subsidies.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.
2nd stage: production
In the second stage, levels of restructuring are already chosen and firms choose their pre-
ferred level of production. In a Nash equilibrium, each firm optimizes its profits assuming
that output of the other firm is constant.
There are five potential market structures: firm 1 or 2 can be a blockaded monopoly,
each can deter entry or finally both firms can produce in duopoly.
Suppose first that firm 2 is more efficient: 0.4 − e2 < c1 − e1. Monopoly of firm 2
emerges if the best-reply of firm 1 is not to enter, that is when the monopoly price is lower
than marginal cost in firm 1:
1− xM2 < c1 − e1 (47)
Since xM2 =
1−(0.4−e2)
2 , (47) reduces to
e2 > 1.4− 2(c1 − e1) = l1(e1) (48)
Duopoly is the equilibrium if firm 2’s duopoly profits are higher than entry-deterrence
profits, which reduces to
e2 < 0.65− 54(c1 − e1) = l2(e1) (49)
Otherwise, entry-deterrence by firm 2 is the equilibrium.
Suppose now that firm 1 is more efficient: e2 < 0.4 − c1 + e1 = l3(e1). By symmetric
reasoning, duopoly will emerge if
e2 > 0.2− 45(c1 − e1) = l4(e1) (50)
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and monopoly if
e2 < −0.1− 12(c1 − e1) = l5(e1) (51)
However, l5 is never binding since it is located outside of the rectangle C = (0, c1)× (0, c2),
in which restructuring efforts must be according to our assumptions. It is a consequence
of fixing c2 low enough.
6
-
e2
e1
c2
c1
l1
l2
E2
D
E1
M2
l4
Figure 6: There are four market structures in the equilibrium of the second stage of the
benchmark game.
In the M2 area firm 2 is the monopolist, in the E2 area firm 2 deters entry of firm 1,
in the D area both firms compete and in the E1 area firm 1 deters entry of firm 2.
1st stage: restructuring
Knowing the equilibrium outcome of the second stage, firms choose restructuring levels:
ei ∈ (0, ci). Profits of firms are
Π2 =

0 if (e1, e2) ∈ E1
1
9 [1− 2(0.4− e2) + (c1 − e1)]2 − 52e22 if (e1, e2) ∈ D
[(c1 − e1)− (0.4− e2)](a− c1 + e1)− 52e22 if (e1, e2) ∈ E2
1
4 [1− (0.4− e2)]2 − 52e22 if (e1, e2) ∈M2
(52)
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and symmetrically
Π1 =

0 if (e1, e2) ∈M2 or E2
1
9 [1− 2(c1 − e1) + (0.4− e2)]2 − 52e21 if (e1, e2) ∈ D
[(0.4− e2)− (c1 − e1)](1− (0.4− e2)− 52e21 if (e1, e2) ∈ E1
(53)
In order to find a Nash equilibrium, we first find reaction functions. Their location
depends on the value of c1 ∈ (0.4, 1). We start with the locating best-reply in each market
structure separately by solving first order conditions. This is sufficient, since for d = 5 all
profit functions Πi are concave in ei. Then we compare profits across market structures
for a given ej , taking into account possible corner solutions, and in this way we identify
reaction functions.
In monopoly, the best-reply function is independent of the rival’s restructuring:
eMi =
1− ci
9
ΠMi =
5(1− ci)2
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(54)
Monopoly of firm 2 is possible when area M2 overlaps the rectangle C, like in the Figure 6.
That happens when l1 intersects e2 = 0.4 for positive e1, which is equivalent to c1 > 0.5.
Best-reply eM2 overlaps area M2 for e1 ∈ (0, c1 − 0.6667). Otherwise, eMi is located below
l1, so the best-reply in monopoly is a corner solution which for a given e1 is closest to eM2
and that is e2 = l1(e1).
In entry-deterrence, the best-reply function does depend on the rival’s restructuring:
eEi =
1− (cj − ej)
5
ΠEi =
1− (cj − ej)
10
[1− 10ci + 9(cj − ej)] (55)
eE2 always cuts l1 in the same point as e
M
2 and it cuts l2 for e1 = c1−0.428571. Therefore,
for e1 > c1 − 0.428571, the highest profit in entry-deterrence brings a corner solution
e2 = l2 and for e1 < c1 − 0.66667 a corner solution e2 = l1.
Finally, the best-reply function in duopoly:
eDi =
4
37
[1− 2ci + cj − ej ] ΠDi =
5
37
[1− 2ci + cj − ej ]2 (56)
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eD2 cuts l2 for e1 = c1− 0.462687 and for lower e1 the highest duopoly profit available can
be achieved by e2 = l2. eD2 cuts l4 for e1 = c1 − 0.196429 and for higher e1 the highest
duopoly profit can be achieved by e2 = l4.
When the rival deters entry or is the monopolist, best-reply is not to restructure at
all, since it generates no revenue, but costs.
Finally we can find the reaction function of firm 2. We choose the best-reply which
brings the highest payoff to firm 2 for a given e1. For e1 < c1−0.6667, which in figure 7 is
denoted by letter A, it is necessarily eM2 . Next, we compare pi
E
2 with monopoly profit on
l1 and we conclude that firm 2 always prefers to deter entry. Next, we compare optimal
entry-deterrence profit piE2 with optimal duopoly profit pi
D
2 . Duopoly is more profitable
for e1 > c1 − 0.446986, denoted below as B. For e1 = c1 − 0.196429 (point C in figure
7), eD2 cuts l4. For higher e1 the highest duopoly profit for firm 2 is for e2 = l4. It is
the best-reply if it is positive and that happens for e1 between points C and D. Firm 2’s
reaction function is depicted in red in figure 7.
-
e1
eM2
eED2
eD2

6e2
A B C D
Figure 7: Reaction function of firm 2 is discontinuous.
We find firm 1’s reaction function in a similar way. Monopoly is never possible here. eE1
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never intersects area E1, so the best-reply in entry-deterrence is always a corner solution
e1 = l−14 (e2). In duopoly, the best-reply is e
D
1 for e2 < 0.739286 − 1.33929c1 = G and
l−12 (e1) otherwise. E is positive when c1 < 0.552.
In order to find firm 1’s final reaction function we first compare entry-deterrence profit
in the corner solution e1 = l−14 with optimal duopoly profits and we find that duopoly is
always better. And finally, we check when duopoly profit is positive on l−12 . That happens
for e2 < 0.88476 − 1.48476c1 = H, with H positive if c1 < 0.5958. Otherwise, best-reply
of firm 1 is e1 = 0. The reaction function is depicted in red in Figure 8.
6e1
G
-
H e20.4
c1
Figure 8: Reaction function of firm 1.
Since we now have the reaction functions, we can look for an equilibrium. If c1 >
0.5958, H is negative and firm 1 always prefers not to restructure. If additionally c1 >
0.6667 = c1, firm 2 is a monopolist, and for c1 ∈ (0.5958, 0.6667) it deters entry of firm 1.
For c1 ∈ (0.55, 0.5958) G is negative, but H positive. Firm 1 undertakes suboptimal
duopoly restructuring or no restructuring. No restructuring reaction always cuts eED2 in
this c1 range, so the outcome here is also entry-deterrence. Down to c1 = 0.532987 = c˜1
the situation is the same, since then H < eED2 (e1 = 0) For c1 < 0.485749 = c1, duopoly
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best-replies intersect in D, so the outcome is duopoly. For c1 ∈ (c1, c˜1) reaction functions
do not intersect (intersect in the point of discontinuity, perhaps mixed strategy equilibrium
there).
Proof of Proposition 4.
We first note that the last two stages of the game are the same as in the benchmark case,
with the only difference that firm 1’s initial marginal cost is c1 − k1. A positive k1 moves
reaction function eD2 down, while pushing e
E
2 and e
D
1 up in the (e1, e2) space. The lines
l1, l2 and l4 dividing the C area are all pushed upwards, too:
l1s = 1.4− 2(c1 − k1 − e1) (57)
l2s(e1) = 0.65− 54(c1 − k1 − e1) (58)
l4s(e1) = 0.2− 45(c1 − k1 − e1) (59)
l5s is still located outside of C.
Best-reply of firm 2 does not change except for replacing c1 with c1 − k1, compared
with Proposition 2. Best-reply of firm 1 becomes more interesting, because now marginal
cost c1 − k1 may be also lower than 0.4.
Monopoly of firm 1 is excluded by the low choice of c2, but entry-deterring reaction of
firm 1 is now possible. Using the technique form the previous proof, we find that eEs1 is
best-reply for firm 1 when e2 < 0.32169−0.92169(c1−k1). For 0.32169−0.92169(c1−k1) <
e2 < 0.739286−1.33929(c1−k1) best-reply is eDs1 . For 0.739286−1.33929(c1−k1) < e2 <
0.884761− 1.48476(c1 − k1), the best-reply is a part of the l2 line, and for even higher e2
it is best for firm 1 not to restructure at all.
The next step in the proof is to find the equilibrium in the second stage of the game,
which is where the two best-replies cross. Analogously to the previous proof, we get
monopoly of firm 2 when c1 − k1 > 0.6667 and entry-monopoly of firm 2 when 0.6667 >
c1 − k1 > 0.532987. Duopoly is the equilibrium when both duopoly reaction functions
cross in the D area and this time eDs1 is longer than in the benchmark, so we get duopoly
for 0.485749 > c1 − k1 > 0.299953. Finally, we get entry-deterrence by firm 1 if c1 − k1 <
0.229143.
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1st stage: subsidy
The first stage of the game is the choice of the optimal subsidy. Government 1 understands
perfectly what will happen in the later two stages. Welfare in country 1 is a piecewise-
defined function, depending on the value of k1. For some values of c1 in the benchmark
model pure strategy equilibrium does not exist and then we assume that welfare in country
1 is equal to zero. First we calculate welfare for each market structure separately.
When
c1 − 0.229143 < k1 < c1 (60)
reaction functions cut each other where firm 1 deters entry and firm 2 exits. Welfare in
country 1 is
WE11s = pi
E1
1 + αCS
E1 − 5
2
k21 = 0.275999− 0.6c1 + 0.6k1 − 2.5k21 + 0.18α (61)
and it is maximized for
kE11 = 0.12 (62)
which is independent of any parameter and fulfils condition (60) when
m1 = 0.12 < c1 < 0.349143 = m2. (63)
Since we assumed that c1 > 0.4, we always have kE11 < c1 − 0.229143. Therefore the
government will always choose a corner solution kE1c1 = c1−0.229143, with welfare denoted
by a star
WE1∗1 = 0.0072479 + 1.145715c1 − 2.5c21 + 0.18α. (64)
Duopoly is the outcome if
c1 − c1 < k1 < c1 − 0.299953. (65)
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Welfare of country 1 is then equal to
WD1s = pi
D
1 + αCS
D − 5
2
k21 = (66)
=k21(−1.885155 + 0.06692α) + k1[c1(−1.229689− 0.133849α) + (0.80402 + 0.21416α)]
+0.171326α+ 0.262855 + c1(−0.804027− 0.214158α) + c21(0.614844 + 0.0669α)
Optimal subsidy in this case is
kD1 =
−0.804028 + 1.22969c1 − 0.214158α+ 0.133849c1α
0.133849α− 3.77031 (67)
and it fulfils condition (65) when
m3 = 0.38698 + 0.034802α < c1 < 0.52709 + 0.029828α = m4 (68)
In this range the government can choose the peak of the welfare parabola and otherwise
we have corner solutions. For α < 0.373931 we have m3 < 0.4, so is this range of α the
lower boundary on c1 is 0.4.
Entry-deterring monopoly of firm 2 emerges when
c1 − c1 < k1 < c1 − c˜1. (69)
Welfare in country 1 is then
WE21s = −
5
2
k21 +
1
2
α(1− c1 + k1)2 (70)
and optimal k1 -the one which fulfils first order condition- is here
kE21 =
α(1− c1)
5− α (71)
This optimal subsidy fulfils condition (69) when
m5 = 0.532987 + 0.0934α < c1 < 0.6667 + 0.06666α = m6 (72)
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Figure 9: Government has 5 different cases to consider.
Again, in this range the peak of the welfare parabola and otherwise a corner solution is
chosen.
Finally, 0 < k1 < c1 − c1 equilibrium market structure is a blockaded monopoly with
welfare WM21s = 0.0555556α independent of k1.
The government chooses k1 ∈ [0, c1] depending on α and c1. We plot the lines m3, m4,
m5, m6 and c1 = 0.4 in the (α, c1) space and we notice that there are 5 cases to consider.
• The first case is for 0.4 < c1 < m3, it is possible only for α > 0.3739. Here, the
government has a choice betweenWE1∗1 ,WD1 (k1 = c1−0.299953),WE21 (k1 = c1− c˜1)
and monopoly welfare WM21 . Simple calculation shows that W
E1∗
1 is always the
highest, so this is the optimal choice of the government.
• The second case is for m3 < c1 < m4. Here, optimal duopoly choice is possible. The
government compares WE1∗1 with WD1 (kD1 ), WE21 (k1 = c1 − c˜1) and WM21 and finds
that WE1∗1 is the highest for c1 < min[f1(α), f6(α)] where
f1 = 0.33359 + 0.0366975α− 0.024098
√
(α− 28.168411)(0.50916 + α)
f6 = 0.47224 + 0.0467012α
Duopoly generates highest welfare for f1(α) < c1 < min[m4(α), f6(α)] and entry-
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deterrence by firm 2 is the best for max[f5, f6] < c1 < m4, where
f5(α) = 0.56271 + 0.02856α− 1.38407
√
(α− 28.1684)2(α− 0.27334)
153377− 5445α for α ∈ (0.27334, 1)
• The third case is for m4 < c1 < m5. Here, the government chooses the highest of
WE1∗1 , WD1 (k1 = c1 − c1), WE21 (k1 = c1 − c˜1) and WM21 . We check that WD1 (k1 =
c1 − c1) < WE21 (k1 = c1 − c˜1) when
c1 > 0.5829− 0.109912α = f2.
The line f2 divides the area into two parts. To the right of it, the government will
choose such k1 which will lead to entry-deterrence by firm 2. To the left there is
duopoly.
• The fourth case is for m5 < c1 < m6. Here kE21 is available. The government
compares WE1∗1 , WD1 (k1 = c1 − c1), WE21 (kE21 ) and WM21 and chooses duopoly if
c1 < 0.485749 + +0.10285α+ 0.062697
√
(α− 5)(α− 0.35357) = f3 and α < 0.35357
or monopoly of firm 2 if
c1 > 1− 0.14907
√
5− α = f4
• The final case is for m6 < c1 < 1. Here the government chooses the highest ofWE1∗1 ,
WD1 (k1 = c1 − c1), WE21 (k1 = c1 − c1) and WM21 . For such a high c1, it is always
most profitable not to subsidize and achieve WM21 .
Putting the choice of the government together, we get Proposition 4.
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